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I. ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING, LICENSURE, AND
CERTIFICATION DEVELOPMENTS
A. TEXAS STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
1. 5.01(a) Corporations
HE Texas State Board of Medical Examiners (TSBME) issued
proposed regulations1 that were adopted without change effective
January 12, 1996,2 relating to non-profit corporations certified by
1. 20 Tex. Reg. 9246 (1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 107 (1996) (to be codified at 22
TEX. ADMIN. CODE ch. 177) (Tex. Bd. of Medical Examiners, Certification of Non-Profit
Health Corporations).
2. See 21 Tex. Reg. 107 (1996).
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TSBME pursuant to section 5.01(a) of the Medical Practice Act (MPA). 3
These corporations, referred to in the health care industry variously as
5.01(a)'s, non-profit health corporations (NPHCs), or by the Texas De-
partment of Insurance as approved non-profit health corporations
(ANHCs), and referred to in this Article as ANHCs, provide several
unique business alternatives not otherwise available in Texas. The regula-
tions issued by TSBME relate to the business activity of an ANHC that
employs physicians. Other than an individual physician or a professional
association, the ANHC is the only type of entity that can employ
physicians.
The regulations issued by TSBME affect, for the most part, the opera-
tion of an ANHC that has a non-physician member of the corporation.
Although the rules pertaining to certification, recertification, and admin-
istrative reporting apply to all ANHCs, the TSBME imposed specific re-
quirements and limitations on ANHCs with a non-physician member.
For example, individuals who serve on the ANHC's board of directors (or
trustees) must "actively practice medicine," which includes clinical prac-
tice; clinical medical research; supervision and training of medical stu-
dents or residents; and professional managerial, administrative, or
supervisory activities related to the practice of medicine or delivery of
health care.4 Additionally, non-physician members of the ANHC must
obtain majority approval by the physician board of directors before they
revise bylaws or appoint board members.5 Only the board of directors
may terminate a physician's employment with the ANHC6 or adopt poli-
cies related to credentialing, quality assurance, utilization review, or peer
review.7 Should the non-physician member seek to terminate a physi-
cian's employment with an ANHC, the physician is entitled to due pro-
cess.8 TSBME has not indicated what constitutes due process other than
requiring that the process be defined by a policy of the board of directors
or contained in the contract between the employed physician and the
ANHC.9
The new TSBME regulations further require biennial reports from an
organization's CEO and each board director. 10 The CEO's report must
3. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b (Vernon Supp. 1997).
4. 20 Tex. Reg. 9246 (1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 107 (1996) (to be codified at 22
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 177.3).
5. Id. (to be codified at § 177.5).
6. Id. (to be codified at § 177.4).
7. Id. Non-physician members of the ANHC may reserve authority without board
approval for matters involving financial decisions including: capital, operating budgets,
physician compensation and benefits, expenditure of funds, and managed care contracts in
which the organization is at financial risk. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. (to be codified at § 177.12).
10. Organizations seeking certification must submit information that is essentially the
same as the biennial reports and the initial $2500 fee for certification. Thereafter, the
biennial fee to maintain certification is $500. Id. (to be codified at § 177.7). An appeal
process exists for organizations that have been denied certification or notified that a poten-
tial decertification may occur.
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disclose corporate information such as the names and addresses of mem-
bers of the corporation, officers, and directors, and whether there have
been any revisions to the articles of incorporation or governing bylaws.11
The biennial reports required from each board director must verify that
the director: (i) continues to meet TSBME qualifications; 12 (ii) exercises
independent medical judgment; (iii) will diligently cause the organization
to comply with the MPA; (iv) will report to the TSBME any attempted
violation of the MPA; and (v) has disclosed any financial relationship the
director has with a member, other board member, or any entity that con-
tracts with the organization.13
2. Medical Records
TSBME issued regulations 14 effective April 16, 1996,15 relating to re-
quests for patient records, conditions to the release of records, and maxi-
mum fees that can be charged for the production of the records. The
request for records, which may be provided as copies or in a summary or
narrative form, must be furnished within 30 days after the request and
payment of a reasonable fee. 16 The physician may deny the request, but
must provide a written statement of the reasons for denial.17
Exceptions to the rule permitting the withholding of records pending
receipt of payment include circumstances involving emergency or acute-
medical-care requests from another physician.18 If these exceptions do
not apply and payment has not been made within ten days of the request
for records, the physician must notify the requesting party of non-pay-
ment and may continue to withhold the records.19 The withholding of
records may not, however, be predicated on the patient or the patient's
authorized agent's failure to pay outstanding accounts due to the
physician.20
3. Standing Delegation Orders
TSBME issued regulations2' effective June 14, 1996,22 expanding the
scope of who may provide certain medical services in connection with a
11. Id. (to be codified at § 177.6).
12. These include licensure and active practice.
13. 20 Tex. Reg. 9246 (1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 107 (1996) (to be codified at 22
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 177.6).
14. 21 Tex. Reg. 835 (1996), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 3003 (1996) (to be codified at 22
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 165.1).
15. See 21 Tex. Reg. 3003 (1996).
16. 20 Tex. Reg. 835 (1996), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 3003 (1996) (to be codified at 22
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 165.1(b)). Reasonable fees may not exceed $25 for the first 20 pages
and $0.15 per page thereafter. Id. (to be codified at § 165.1(e)).
17. Id. (to be codified at § 165.1(c)).
18. Id. (to be codified at § 165.1(f)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 21 Tex. Reg. 2628 (1996), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 4995 (1996) (to be codified at 22
TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 193.2-.4, 193.8).
22. See 21 Tex. Reg. 4995 (1996).
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written, standing delegation order. It also clarified and expanded the
scope of circumstances in which such orders may be implemented. Previ-
ous regulations had authorized such orders to physician assistants. How-
ever, the new regulations expanded the scope to include "advanced
practice nurses," defined to include a nurse practitioner, nurse midwife,
nurse anesthetist, and clinical nurse specialist. 23 Carrying out or signing a
prescription drug order was expanded to include the "telephoning in of
an order" if part of a standing delegated order.24 Protocols for imple-
menting prescriptive drug authority must specify "dangerous drugs" that
may not be prescribed in connection with such an order, and such proto-
cols must take into account the training and experience of the nurse or
physician assistant.25
The site at which a nurse or physician assistant may practice in connec-
tion with such orders was expanded to include a physician's primary prac-
tice site or a "facility-based practice. '26 The regulation, which previously
authorized physician assistants to function at a medically underserved lo-
cation, was expanded to authorize nurses to serve these locations. The
new regulation also requires periodic review of the standing orders and
the services provided under such orders. 27 In any of the preceding situa-
tions, other than a physician's primary practice site, documentation must
be maintained indicating the physician's supervision of the nurse or assis-
tant.28 Additionally, TSBME may issue orders or protocols related to
patient treatment in medically underserved areas by nurses or physician
assistants.29
Other specialized forms of delegation authority were authorized for
certified registered nurse anesthetists when such delegation is pursuant to
facility policies or medical staff bylaws regarding the selection and admin-
istration of drugs and application of medical devices necessary to main-
tain a patient's physiological status. 30 Similarly, nurse midwives or
physician assistants appropriately certified may administer controlled
substances during intra-partum and immediate post-partum care. 31
23. 21 Tex. Reg. 2628 (1996), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 4995 (1996) (to be codified at 22
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 193.2).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (to be codified at § 193.8(a),(j)). "Primary practice site" now includes a "loca-
tion where the physician is physically present with the physician assistant or advanced
practice nurse." Id. (to be codified at § 193.8(i)(2)(c)). As used in the phrase "facility-
based practice," a "facility" is a licensed hospital or long-term care facility at which the
physician serves as a medical director, chief of medical staff, credentialing committee chair,
department chair, or a physician who consents to the request of a medical director or chief
of medical staff to delegate prescriptive drug authority. Id. (to be codified at § 193.80)).
27. Id. (to be codified at § 193.8(b)(4)).
28. Id. (to be codified at § 193.8(c)).
29. Id. (to be codified at § 193.8(g)).
30. Id. (to be codified at § 193.8(k)(1)).
31. Id. (to be codified at § 193.8(l)(1)).
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B. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
1. Medicaid Provider Status Termination
In Texas Health Enterprises, Inc. v. Texas Department of Health,32 Texas
Health Enterprises, a nursing home operator, appealed a decision that
upheld the administrative determination to terminate the nursing home's
Medicaid certification. The issue was whether the nursing home had the
right to introduce into the appellate record the administrative agency rec-
ord that had not been introduced into evidence at the trial court. 33
The nursing home contended on appeal that the Administrative Proce-
dure Act 34 was "directory" and not "mandatory" with respect to intro-
duction of the administrative agency record in a judicial appeal.35 After
reviewing legislative history and a recent judicial opinion, 36 the appeals
court determined that the form in which the administrative record was
introduced was not dispositive. 37 The record could be introduced either
in the statement of facts or as part of the transcript. 38 Since the nursing
home had not introduced the administrative agency record in either form
at the trial level, the appeals court held that it could not introduce the
record on appeal. 39
2. Registration Requirements
In Corporate Leasing International, Inc. v. Groves,40 the appellee den-
tists obtained a declaratory judgment ruling that the lease between the
appellant leasing company that owned a laser and the dentists who used
and were in possession of it was illegal, void, and unenforceable because
the leasing company had not registered the laser with state regulatory
authorities. On appeal, the court reversed the declaratory judgment and
rendered judgment for the leasing company. 41
The court's reversal rested on its review of the Texas Regulations for
the Control of Radiation. 42 The regulations clearly required the registra-
tion of the equipment for a person to use or possess "a source of radia-
tion unless that person has a license, registration, or exemption from the
department or commission. '43 The court noted that several parts of the
regulations 44 referred to possession and use of laser products or installa-
tions as requiring registration, but were less clear regarding ownership
32. 925 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ requested).
33. Id. at 751-52.
34. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.175(d) (Vernon 1997).
35. Texas Health Enters., 925 S.W.2d at 752.
36. Nueces Canyon Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Central Educ. Agency, 917 S.W.2d
773, 775-77 (Tex. 1996).
37. Texas Health Enters., 925 S.W.2d at 755.
38. Id. at 754-55 (citing Nueces Canyon, 917 S.W.2d at 775-76).
39. Id. at 756.
40. 925 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
41. Id. at 739.
42. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 401.101-.119 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1996).
43. Id. § 401.101.
44. Id. § 401.104(a), (c).
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and registration requirements. 45 In particular, the court cited sections
70.5(j) and 70.7,46 which emphasized possession and use rather than own-
ership.47 These provisions were persuasive to the court, which held that a
nonpossessory, nonusing owner is not required to register the equip-
ment.48 With this finding, the appeals court awarded damages for non-
payment against the dentists who had not satisfied terms of the lease. 49
C. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES: MEDICAID
INTERMEDIATE CARE FACILITY PROVIDER
STATUS TERMINATION
In the case of Bell v. Texas Department of Human Services,50 the Inter-
mediate Care Facility for Mentally Retarded provider appealed a trial
court decision upholding the Texas Department of Human Services
(TDHS) administrative decision to terminate the provider's Medicaid
certification. On appeal, the provider argued (1) that it did not receive
due process at the agency level and (2) that the agency's decision was not
supported by substantial evidence. While the second argument involved
a review of the specific fact circumstances, the first argument related to a
specific requirement of the Texas Medicaid program that permits the
sanctioning of a provider without notice for conduct or omission of con-
duct involving a "pattern of repeated violations."'51
The provider argued that due process was not provided since TDHS
did not give notice of the repeated violations and, thus, did not afford an
opportunity for correction as required in the Administrative Code. The
appeals court reviewed the Administrative Code and determined that no-
tice of a "pattern of abuse" is not required before TDHS could authorize
termination. 52
D. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE: MANAGED
CARE REGULATIONS
The rules described below and implemented pursuant to Commissioner
of Insurance Order No. 95-1201 were the result of Governor George
Bush, Jr.'s veto of the Patient Protection Act.53 The veto directed the
Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) to promulgate rules to protect the
interests of patients and physicians in matters related to managed health
care.
45. Corporate Leasing, 925 S.W.2d at 737-38.
46. Id. at 738.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 738-39.
49. Id. at 740.
50. No. 03-95-00594-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3814 (Tex. App.-Austin, Aug. 28,
1996, n.w.h.) (not released for publication).
51. See 40 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 79.2115(a)(5) (West 1996).
52. 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3814, at *11.
53. Tex. H.B. 2766, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995).
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The Commissioner of Insurance adopted rules in November 1995 and
March 1996 dealing with: (i) quality of care and fairness to patients and
providers, referred to as Patient Protection I and Patient Protection II;
(ii) ANHCs and the circumstances under which these organizations could
enter into "risk contracting;" (iii) global risk sharing contracts between
primary HMOs and ANHCs and primary HMOs and provider HMOs;
and (iv) amendments to HMO financial accounting requirements. Each
of these rules apply to HMOs; Patient Protection I and Protection II ap-
ply to HMOs and health insurance policies that incorporate preferred
provider plans (PPOs).
1. Patient Protection I
A primary objective of the Patient Protection 154 rules is to maintain
quality of care and fairness to patients. This objective is addressed by
provisions of the rule that provide for disclosure of benefits to prospec-
tive enrollees and insureds. Managed care plans must make available to
prospective group contract holders (employers), enrollees, and insureds
upon request understandable and readable information concerning bene-
fits, providers, limitations, prior authorizations, emergency services, and
other information specified in the rule in a standard form to be pre-
scribed by the TDI.55 This enables group contract holders, enrollees, and
insureds to make informed comparisons among plans.56
The policy objectives of quality care and fairness to patients are also
reflected in the provisions on retaliation. Managed care plans may not
take retaliatory action against: (i) a group contract holder or enrollee be-
cause the group contract holder or enrollee, or person acting on behalf of
the group or enrollees, has complained; or (ii) a physician or provider
because the physician or provider has reasonably complained on behalf
of an enrollee.5 7
Patient Protection I rules require managed care plans to provide rea-
sonable advance notice to enrollees and insureds of the impending termi-
nation of a treating physician or provider from the network. Upon
request by the treating physician or provider, the managed care plan must
provide ongoing treatment for enrollees and insureds with special circum-
stances for up to ninety days after the effective date of termination of the
treating physician or provider. PPOs must make a current list of pre-
ferred providers available to the insured upon termination of a participat-
54. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3703, 11.204, 11.1500-.1501, 11.1601-.1602 (West 1996);
21 Tex. Reg. 2465 (1996) (to be codified as amended at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3704); 20
Tex. Reg. 10740 (1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 2465 (1996) (to be codified at 28 TEX. AD.
MIN. CODE § 3.3705); 21 Tex. Reg. 2467 (1996) (to be codified at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 11.1502, 11.1600).
55. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703 (West 1996).
56. 21 Tex. Reg. 2465 (1996) (to be codified as amended at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE§ 3.3704), 21 Tex. Reg. 2467 (1996) (to be codified at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 11.600).
57. 20 Tex. Reg. 10740 (1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 2465 (1996) (to be codified at 28
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3705(3)).
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ing provider.58 Moreover, managed care plans may not use any financial
incentive or make payment to a physician or provider that acts as an in-
ducement to limit medically necessary services. 59
The issue of unfair and unreasonable denial of reimbursement for
emergency care is addressed by managed care plans, which must demon-
strate the plan will (i) pay for emergency care services performed by non-
network physicians or providers at the negotiated or customary rate; (ii)
cover any medical screening examination or other evaluation required by
state or federal law necessary to determine if an emergency medical con-
dition exists; (iii) cover necessary emergency care services to covered en-
rollees and insureds, including treatment and stabilization of an
emergency medical condition; and (iv) approve or deny coverage of post
stabilization care as requested by a treating physician or provider within
the time appropriate to the circumstances relating to the delivery of serv-
ices and the condition of enrollee, but in no case to exceed one hour.
60
Managed care plans must submit data to the TDI concerning quality,
costs, and access to health care. The plans must file or provide upon re-
quest to TDI certain information such as the identification of providers,
their specialties, and locations; types of compensation arrangements with
providers; and utilization review plans.61
Under Patient Protection I, enrollees have the right to select a network
provider. The plan application form must include a space for the enrollee
to make a selection of a primary care physician or primary care pro-
vider.62 Enrollees also must have the opportunity to "select or change a
primary care physician or primary care provider within the HMO deliv-
ery network of available primary care physicians and summary care prov-
iders."63 However, an enrollee may not change the primary-care
physician more than four times in any twelve-month period.
64
Patient Protection I also involves fairness to providers since a stable
provider network is believed to offer the best care to enrollees. 65 Appli-
cation information must be made available to interested providers, and
managed care plans must make information concerning the application
process available to physicians and providers who wish to apply for ad-
mission to the plan.6 6 Furthermore, written reasons must be offered for
58. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 11.1601 (West 1996); 21 Tex. Reg. 2465 (1996) (to be
codified 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE at § 3.3704).
59. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703; 11.1501 (West 1996).
60. Id. § 11.204(20); 21 Tex. Reg. 2465 (1996) (to be codified at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.3704).
61. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 11.204(18-19) (West 1996).
62. Id. § 11.1602.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. §§ 11.1601-1603, 3.3703; 21 Tex. Reg. 2465 (1996) (to be codified as amended at
28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3704); 20 Tex. Reg. 10740 (1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 2465
(1996) (to be codified at § 3.3705).
66. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3703, 11.1601(a) (West 1996).
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denial or termination of providers. 67 The rules do not prohibit plans from
denying admission because the plan has sufficient qualified providers. 68
Managed care plans must offer an advisory review panel to review,
upon request, a decision to terminate a physician or dentist. 69 Plans may
use existing review committees, but one member of the advisory review
panel must be a physician or dentist with the same or similar specialty as
the physician or dentist, if available. 70 Pre-termination review, however,
is not required if there exists a risk of imminent harm to patient health. 71
Managed care plans that use economic profiling must make available
to physicians and providers upon request the economic profiles of that
physician or provider. 72 Additionally, HMO capitation payments to a
primary-care physician or provider must begin within ninety days of se-
lection or assignment, calculated from the date of enrollment. 73 If selec-
tion does not occur, the HMO must reserve the capitation payable until a
selection or assignment is made. 74 If an enrollee does not select a pri-
mary-care physician or provider, the HMO will assign a primary care
physician or provider who is located in a zip code nearest to the enrollee's
residence or place of employment. 75 An HMO may propose to the de-
partment an alternative capitation plan that provides for immediate avail-
ability and accessibility to a primary care physician or provider and
adequately compensates the primary-care physician or provider for the
risk assumed.76
2. Patient Protection I
Patient Protection I177 regulations were implemented to address con-
cerns regarding rights of providers in managed care contracting activities.
These rules include a contract holder's right to cancel coverage. A con-
tract holder may cancel the contract based upon material changes to any
provisions required to be disclosed to contract holders or the enrollees by
HMO rule or other law, after not less than thirty days written notice to
the HMO.78
There are separate rules for HMOs and PPOs for referral to an out-of-
network physician or provider if medically necessary covered services are
not available. Under the HMO rule, if medically necessary covered serv-
ices are not available through network physicians or providers, then the
67. Id. § 11.1601(b); 20 Tex. Reg. 10740 (1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 2465 (1996) (to






73. Id. § 11.1603(1).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 11.1603(2).
76. Id. § 11.1603(3)(a), (b).




contract must provide for referral of a non-network physician or provider
upon the request of a network physician or provider. The HMO has a
reasonable period of time after the network physician or provider re-
quests the referral, and the HMO must fully reimburse the non-network
physician or provider at either the usual and customary rate or an agreed
upon rate. Before a request for referral is denied, each contract must
provide for a review by a specialist of the same or similar specialty as the
type of physician or provider to whom a referral is requested.79
The PPO rule provides that a health insurance policy that includes dif-
ferent benefits from the basic level of coverage for use of preferred prov-
iders must provide that "[i]f covered services are not available through
preferred providers, the insurer must pay for medically necessary covered
services by a non-preferred provider at the preferred provider level of
benefits." 80
With respect to HMO medicare advertising, any HMO that offers cov-
erage to Medicare beneficiaries must file with the TDI copies of any ad-
vertisement produced by the HMO or its agents related to the Medicare
coverage, and which is considered an invitation to inquire8' or invitation
to contract. 82 These advertisements must be filed for review for compli-
ance with Texas law and consistency with other documents.83
Under Patient Protection II, there is no indemnification of an HMO
for the HMO's negligence. 84 The HMO must also disclose to a patient
"Hold Harmless" clauses in the written description of health care plan
terms and conditions provided to prospective group contract holders and
enrollees. The HMO must explain that, except as set forth in the plan
description, network physicians and providers have agreed to look only to
the HMO for payment of covered services. 85
Finally, "a preferred provider contract must include a provision stating
that the physician or provider agrees that if the preferred provider is
compensated on a discounted fee basis, the insured may be billed based
only on the discounted fee and not the full charge. '86
79. Id. § 11.506.
80. Id. § 3.3704.
81. An "invitation to inquire" is "an advertisement that has as its objective the crea-
tion of a desire to inquire further about the product, and that is limited to a brief descrip-
tion of the loss for which the benefit is payable." 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.113(a) (West
1996).
82. An "invitation to contract," is an advertisement that is not an invitation to inquire
or an institutional advertisement. Id. § 21.113(b).
83. Id. § 21.113; 21 Tex. Reg. 2467 (1996) (to be codified at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 11.603).
84. "A contract between an HMO and a physician or provider may not contain any
clause purporting to indemnify the HMO for any tort liability resulting from acts or omis-
sions of the HMO." 21 Tex. Reg. 2467 (1996) (to be codified at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 11.1502).
85. Id. (to be codified at § 11.1600).




The TDI has designated certain entities as being able to enter into
specified types of risk contracts; one of these types of entities is the
ANHC. Article 21.52F, section 2, of the Texas Insurance Code provides
that an ANHC must maintain a certificate of authority issued by the TDI
in order to arrange for or provide a health care plan to enrollees on a
prepaid basis.88 However, Article 21.52F does not apply to:
(1) an [ANHC] that contracts to arrange for or provide health care
services on a fee-for-service basis; (2) contracts entered into by a cer-
tificate holder to arrange for or provide health care services on a fee-
for-service basis; or (3) an activity exempt from regulation under
Section 26(f) of the Texas Health Maintenance Organization Act.89
Moreover, an ANHC that "arrange[s] for or provide[s] health care serv-
ices on a risk-sharing or capitated risk arrangement on behalf of a health
maintenance organization .. .is not required to obtain a certificate of
authority."90
To obtain an ANHC certificate of authority, an applicant ANHC must
comply with each requirement imposed on an HMO and maintain ac-
creditation with either the National Committee on Quality Assurance or
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organization's
network accreditation program.91 For an ANHC provisional certificate
of authority, the Commissioner of Insurance shall grant the provisional
certificate if the applicant ANHC complies with all requirements imposed
on an HMO and applies for and diligently pursues accreditation. 92 A
provisional certificate may not be granted if the ANHC has been denied
accreditation.
In order to maintain a certificate of authority or a provisional certifi-
cate of authority, an ANHC must comply with all the appropriate re-
quirements that an HMO must comply with under the Insurance and
Administrative Codes, 93 and applicable state insurance laws and regula-
tions.94 The requirements to obtain and maintain a certificate of author-
ity do not apply to ANHCs that "arrange for or provide only medical care
87. See generally part I.A.1 regarding statutory characteristics and regulatory
developments for approved non-profit health corporations (ANHCs).
88. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.52F, § 2(c) (Vernon 1997).
89. Id. ch. 20A.
90. Id. art. 21.52F, § 2(c) (Vernon 1996) (emphasis added).
91. 21 Tex. Reg. 2253 (1996) (to be codified at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 11.1702(a)).
92. Id. (to be codified at § 11.1702(b)).
93. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. ch. 20A (Vernon 1997); 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ch. 11 (West
1997). Agents of an ANHC certificate of authority or provisional certificate of authority
holder are considered HMO agents and must comply with the requirements applicable to
HMO agents. 21 Tex. Reg. 2253 (1996) (to be codified at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE§ 11.1703). An ANHC with a certificate of authority or provisional certificate of authority
under Insurance Code Article 21.52F and Title 28 of the Texas Administrative Code are
subject to the same statutes and rules as an HMO and are considered an HMO for pur-
poses of regulation and regulatory enforcement. Id. (to be codified at § 11.1704).




as defined in the Insurance Code, article 20A.02(k). ' '95
4. Global Risk-Sharing Contracts-ANHCs and Provider HMOs
An ANHC or a "provider HMO ''96 may contract with a "primary
HMO ' '97 to provide full-risk pre-paid health services. 98 The TDI rules
apply to any primary HMO which contracts for the ANHC to arrange for
or to provide for, on its behalf, any health care services, other than medi-
cal care or ancillary medical services, on either a risk-sharing or capitated
risk arrangement for the primary HMO as part of its delivery network; or
to any provider HMO which agrees to arrange for or provide health care
services on a risk-sharing or capitated risk arrangement as part of the
primary HMO delivery network. 99 For global risk-sharing contracts be-
tween primary HMOs and ANHCs and between primary HMOs and pro-
vider HMOs, the primary and provider HMOs must comply with all of
the following requirements.
First, the primary HMO is required to submit a monitoring plan to the
TDI. This plan should set out the plan for ensuring that the ANHC or
provider HMO can effectively provide timely and accurate reimburse-
ment to all physicians and providers under the contract; and should show
how the primary HMO will ensure the contracted HMO functions fully
comply with all regulatory requirements. 100
Second, the primary HMO is required to file the form of HMO/ANHC
or HMO/HMO agreement with the TDI. This written agreement must
include provisions whereby the ANHC or provider HMO cannot termi-
nate the agreement without ninety days written notice, as well as provi-
sions limiting the ANHC or provider HMO from billing or collecting
from HMO members for covered services and a provision that states that
nothing in the contract shall limit the HMO's authority or responsibility
95. Id. (to be codified at § 11.1702(d)). "Medical care" means furnishing those serv-
ices defined as practicing medicine under section 1.03(8) of the MPA. TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4495b (Vernon Supp. 1997).
96. 21 Tex. Reg. 2253 (1996) (to be codified at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 11.2(b)(23)).
"Provider HMO" is defined as "an HMO that contracts directly or indirectly through con-
tracts or subcontracts with a primary HMO to provide or arrange to provide health care
services on behalf of the primary HMO within an HMO delivery network." Id.
97. Id. (to be codified at § 11.2(b)(20)). A "primary HMO" is "[ajn HMO that con-
tracts directly with, and issues an evidence of coverage to, individuals or organizations for
the primary HMO to arrange for or provide a health care plan or a single health care
service plan to enrollees on a prepaid basis." Id.
98. Id. (to be codified at §§ 11.2, 11.1604); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.02 (Vernon
1996). "Health care services" are
any services, including the furnishing to any individual of pharmaceutical
services, medical, chiropractic, or dental care, or hospitalization or incident
to the furnishing of such services, care or hospitalization, as well as the fur-
nishing to any person of any and all other services for the purpose of
preventing, alleviating, curing, or healing human illness or injury or a single
health care service plan.
TEX. INs. CODE ANN. art. 20A.02(i) (Vernon 1996).
99. 21 Tex. Reg. 2253 (1996) (to be codified at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 11.1604(a)).
100. Id. (to be codified at § 11.1604(a)(1)).
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to comply with all regulatory requirements. 101
The agreement must further include the ANHC's or provider HMO's
acknowledgement that the primary HMO is required to comply with all
regulatory requirements; the HMO may monitor and oversee the ANHC
or provider HMO; and the HMO is entitled to take action to assure that
the ANHC or provider HMO are in full compliance with regulatory re-
quirements. The agreement must allow the primary HMO access to the
ANHC's contracts with physicians and providers and "require the ANHC
to provide the primary HMO, with evidence of both financial solvency
and financial ability to perform, such as a certified financial audit of the
ANHC conducted by independent certified public accountants, utilizing
generally accepted accounting and auditing principles."' 10 2 Finally, the
agreement must include a provision where the ANHC or provider HMO
provide, at least monthly to the primary HMO, the necessary data to
comply with regulatory reporting requirements. 10 3
Global risk-sharing contracts between the primary HMOs and ANHCs
or provider HMOs also require the primary HMO to conduct an annual
on-site audit of the ANHC or provider HMO. More frequent on-site au-
dits are required upon indication of material non-compliance with all reg-
ulatory requirements. "Written documentation of each audit ... shall be
made available to Texas Department of Insurance or the Texas Depart-
ment of Health upon request."'1 4 The primary HMO must promptly cor-
rect an ANHC's failure to comply with regulatory requirements relating
to any delegated matters which are necessary for the primary HMO's
101. Id. (to be codified at § 11.1604(a)(2)).
102. Id. (to be codified at § 11.1604(f)).
103. The reporting information that the ANHC or provider HMO must include:
(i) number of primary HMO enrollees served ... ;
(ii) form of the contracts and subcontracts between the ANHC and physi-
cians and providers ... ;
(iii) copayments received by the ANHC or provider HMO;
(iv) summary of the amounts paid by the ANHC or provider HMO to
physicians and providers;
(v) methods by which physicians and providers were paid by the ANHC
or provider HMO (capitation, fee-for-services, or other risk-sharing
arrangements);
(vi) utilization data;
(vii) summary of the amounts paid by the ANHC or provider HMO for
administrative services relating to the primary HMOs;
(viii) time period that claims and debts related to claims owed by the
ANHC or provider HMO have been pending;
(ix) information required for the primary HMO to be able to file claims
for reinsurance, coordination of benefits and subrogation;
(x) provider-enrollee satisfaction data;
(xi) complaint data;
(xii) documentation of any inquiries and investigation of the ANHC or
provider HMO, or any individual subcontracting physician or provider ...
and
(xiii) any other data necessary to assure proper monitoring and control of
the primary HMO delivery network by the primary HMO.
Id. (to be codified at § 11.1604(2)(G)(i-xiii)).




5. HMO Liabilities-Amendments to Accounting Requirements
The Administrative Code imposed on HMOs certain reporting require-
ments that relate to accounting practices. 106 An HMO is required to re-
port each liability incurred by the HMO on all financial statement or
other reports filed with the TDI.10 7 Each HMO is also required to clarify
incurred claim liabilities. Incurred claim liabilities include "all liabilities
and expenses relating to medical and health care services provided by
HMO delivery network and non-network physicians and providers."'10 8
The accounting requirements disallow credit for any risk-sharing arrange-
ment relating to out-of-service area or emergency care provided by non-
network physicians or providers. 10 9
E. TEXAS WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
During the Survey period, the Texas Workers Compensation Commis-
sion (the Commission) issued amendments to rules relating to (1) agree-
ments and settlements;110 (2) disclosure of provider financial interests;"'
and (3) medical fee guidelines. 12
1. Agreements and Settlements After Final Commission Order or
Appeals Panel Decision
Agreements that an insurance carrier or representative has reached af-
ter a decision of an appeals panel or a hearing officer has become final
must be filed with the Commission. The filing must be at least thirty days
prior to the earlier of (i) the date the agreement is sent to the parties for
signature or (ii) the date the agreement is sent to a court for approval;
and "no later than 10 days after a court approves the agreement or settle-
ment."1' 3 This rule became effective February 2, 1996.1 4
105. Id. (to be codified at § 11.1604(a)(4)).
106. Id. (to be codified at § 11.806).
107. Id. (to be codified at § 11.806(a)).
108. Id. (to be codified at § 11.806(b)(4)).
109. A non-network physician or provider is defined as "a physician or provider who
has not directly or indirectly contracted with an HMO or an HMO's network physicians or
providers to provide medical or health care services to the HMO's enrollees." Id. (to be
codified at § 11.806(c)).
110. 20 Tex. Reg. 8580 (1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 514 (1996) (to be codified at 28
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 147.11).
111. 20 Tex. Reg. 8572 (1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 513 (1996) (to be codified at 28
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 134.100). The effective date of this regulation was February 2, 1996.
See 21 Tex. Reg. 513 (1996).
112. 21 Tex. Reg. 2090 (1996), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 2361 (1996) (to be codified at 28
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 134.201).
113. Id.
114. See 21 Tex. Reg. 514 (1996).
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2. Disclosure by Health Care Providers of Financial Interest in
Referring Providers
A health care provider who makes a referral of an employee-patient to
another health care provider in which the referring provider owns a fi-
nancial interest1 15 greater than five percent must notify the Commission
within thirty days of the referral. 116 The disclosure must include informa-
tion about the referring provider, the referral source and the ownership
percentage in the referral source. 117
3. Medical Fee Guidelines
New medical fee guidelines were issued relating to reimbursement
levels for medical services, durable medical equipment, and pharmaceuti-
cals. 118 The new fee guidelines became effective April 1, 1996.119
F. TEXAS STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF PSYCHOLOGISTS
In a letter opinion from the Office of the Attorney General 120 the At-
torney General responded to a request from the Texas State Board of
Examiners of Psychologists (the Board) regarding an apparent conflict
between Senate Bill 667, enacted by the Texas legislature in 1995, and an
existing rule of the Board (the Rule) 121 relating to the requirement of
patient consent to the release of mental health records. The letter opin-
ion stated that the legislation superseded the Board's interpretation of
the Rule. 122
As written on the date of the opinion, the Rule permits the release of
patient information by means of a patient's written authorization, pursu-
ant to a court order, or as otherwise required by applicable law. 123 The
Rule is susceptible to more than one interpretation, and the Board's posi-
tion was that patient authorization was needed when a subpoena was is-
sued. In addressing the request, the Attorney General's office first
reviewed that part of Senate Bill 667 which was codified in the Health
and Safety Code, 124 and found that it did not require as an express condi-
tion the receipt of patient authorization. Therefore, a psychologist could
comply with a subpoena without written authorization.
The Attorney General also examined the Texas Rules of Civil Evi-
115. "[F]inancial interest is defined as any legal or equitable interest including partner-
ship interest, community property, or shares or bonds of a corporation." 20 Tex. Reg. 8572(1995), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 513 (1996) (to be codified at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 134.100(b)).
116. Id. (to be codified at § 134.100(a)).
117. Id.
118. See 21 Tex. Reg. 2361 (1996).
119. Id.
120. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-102 (1996).
121. 22 TEX ADMIN. CODE § 465.22(d)(3) (West 1996).
122. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-102 (1996).
123. Id.
124. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 611.006(a)(11) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
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dence, in particular Rule 510125 as it relates to compliance with a sub-
poena and the privilege of confidentiality. The permitted exceptions
expressed in Rule 510 were seen as similar to the exceptions enumerated
in the Health and Safety Code provisions. Thus, Rule 510 and the Code
provisions were determined not to be in conflict.
The request included questions involving potential liability on the part
of a psychologist in responding to a subpoena with respect to whether the
psychologist should notify the patient of the attempt to obtain patient
information, and whether it was the duty of the psychologist to assert the
privilege of confidentiality through the process of seeking to quash the
subpoena. The opinion did not offer specific answers, but acknowledged
that courts in other jurisdictions imposed tort liability for the improper
release of mental health records. 126 Similarly, the opinion stated that no
authority could be identified that imposed an affirmative duty on the part
of the mental health practitioner to invoke the motion to quash a sub-
poena process.127 The opinion concluded that the facts and circum-
stances of each individual situation should dictate whether private
counsel should be consulted and whether the patient should be notified of
the particular information request.128
G. PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
1. Prescription and Use of Unapproved Drugs
For two decades, Dr. Stanislaw Burzynski has waged a battle against
state and federal regulators in defense of his controversial assertion that
he should be allowed to prescribe unapproved "antineoplastons" for can-
cer patients. In the federal courts, he was enjoined in 1983 from shipping
antineoplastons in interstate commerce without obtaining the prior ap-
proval of the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA).129 In
1997, he was tried on a 75-count federal indictment that charged that his
continued use of antineoplastons violated the 1983 injunction, constituted
mail fraud and violated federal food and drug laws.130 After a twenty-
day trial, the district court dismissed all thirty-four mail-fraud counts, and
the jury failed to reach a verdict on the remaining forty-one counts.13'
Meanwhile, TSBME pursued Dr. Burzynski in administrative proceed-
ings and state court. TSBME alleged that his intrastate use of antine-




129. See Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Burzynski, 917 S.W.2d 365, 366-67
(Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ requested).
130. See Melissa Fletcher Stoeltje, Cancer Drug Tests the Law, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 7,
1997, at A13.
131. See Deborah Tedford, Burzynski Acquitted of Fraud/Judge Declares Mistrial on
Rest of the Charges, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 4, 1997, at Al. For a partial but fascinating
glimpse of the extent of the litigation spawned by Burzynski's use of antineoplastons, see
Trustees of the Northwest Laundry & Dry Cleaners Health & Welfare Trust Fund v.
Burzynski, 27 F.3d 153, 155, 156 n.12, 159-60 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1115 (1995).
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oplastons, which was not the subject of the 1983 injunction or the 1997
prosecution, violated state law. Specifically, the board charged that
Burzynski's use of antineoplastons violated section 431.114 of the Texas
Health and Safety Code, 132 which the board alleged prohibits Texas phy-
sicians from prescribing drugs not approved by the FDA, even if the
drugs are limited to intrastate uses only.133 Although the administrative
law judge rejected TSBME's position, TSBME concluded that Dr.
Burzynski had violated section 431.114.134 On review, the district court
reversed TSBME and dismissed this count, along with all other counts
brought by the board. 135 The court of appeals reversed.
The appellate court directed most of its opinion to the district court's
conclusion that section 431.114 could not be violated by Burzynski be-
cause section 5.09 of the MPA permits physicians to prescribe and sell
drugs that have not been approved by the FDA.136 The court concluded
that "section 5.09 was intended to allow a physician to supply drugs to a
patient in immediate need without violating the provisions of the Texas
Pharmacy Act" and that it "does not authorize physicians to dispense un-
authorized drugs."' 37 Although the United States Court of Appeals for
132. The Health and Safety Code provides that "[a] person shall not sell, deliver, offer
for sale, hold for sale or give away any new drug unless ... an application with respect
thereto has been approved and the approval has not been withdrawn under section 505 of
the [Food, Drug and Cosmetic] Act." Section 431.114 also requires that documentary
proof of the FDA's approval be filed with the state commissioner of health if the product is
manufactured in Texas. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 431.114 (Vernon 1992).
133. TSBME alleged that Burzynski's continued use of the unapproved drug also vio-
lated § 3.08(4)(A) of the Texas MPA. See Burzynski, 917 S.W.2d at 367. Section
3.08(4)(A) makes it a ground for discipline if a physician "commit[s] any act that is in
violation of the laws of the State of Texas if the act is connected with the physician's prac-
tice of medicine." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 3.08(4)(A) (Vernon Supp.
1997). Although the court of appeals' opinion does not specifically address the merits of
TSBME's allegations with respect to the MPA, its final resolution of this appeal reinstates
the board's conclusion that Burzynski violated both § 431.114 of the Health & Safety Code
and § 3.08(4)(A) of the MPA.
The board also alleged that Burzynski violated the false advertising statute, TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 431.183(a)(2) (Vernon 1992), which states that "an ad-
vertisement of a drug or device is false if the advertisement represents that the drug or
device affects neoplasms" or cancer. The district court dismissed this count on the ground
that the statute is unconstitutional, see Burzynski, 917 S.W.2d at 366, but the court of ap-
peals reversed, concluding that Burzynski's marketing brochure concerned an unlawful ac-
tivity and was, therefore, unprotected commercial speech. See id. at 371.
134. Burzynski, 917 S.W.2d at 367.
135. Id.
136. Section 5.09 provides in relevant part:
(a) A physician licensed to practice medicine under this Act may supply
patients with any drugs, remedies, or clinical supplies as are necessary to
meet the patients' immediate needs. This subsection does not permit the
physician to operate a retail pharmacy without first complying with the Texas
Pharmacy Act (Article 4542a-1, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes).
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the physician from supplying
pharmaceutical samples to the patient, free of charge, if, in the opinion of the
physician, it is advantageous to the patient, in adhering to a course of treat-
ment prescribed by the physician, to receive such pharmaceutical samples.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.09 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
137. Burzynski, 917 S.W.2d at 368.
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the Fifth Circuit had earlier reached the same conclusion,138 this appears
to be the first time a Texas state court has so held.
2. Reinstatement Proceedings
In Ramirez v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners,139 the Court of
Appeals in Austin held that when considering applications for reinstate-
ment of a medical license, TSBME must follow the procedures mandated
by the state Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 140 for "contested
cases.' 141 In Ramirez, the board "considered written materials that were
neither admitted into evidence nor provided to Ramirez before or during
the hearing [and] did not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of its order" denying Ramirez' application for reinstatement.
42
On appeal TSBME conceded that it failed to follow the procedures for a
"contested case,"'143 but it argued that reinstatement hearings are not
"adjudicative hearings" within the meaning of the APA and, therefore,
they are not "contested cases" that require an evidentiary hearing.'
44
The court of appeals disagreed, largely because of a 1993 amendment to
the MPA145 that made denials of reinstatement applications subject to
judicial review. Although the APA does not expressly provide for an evi-
dentiary hearing on such applications, the court ruled "that such a hear-
ing is necessarily implied by the language of the [amendment].' ' 46
3. Dental License Revocation-Judicial Review
When the legislature's conflicting statutory commands create a Catch-
22 for litigants, it often takes the Texas Supreme Court to provide a solu-
tion. That is exactly what happened in Simmons v. Texas State Board of
Dental Examiners147 when the Dental Practice Act (DPA)148 combined
with the APA to prevent judicial review of a dentist's license revocation.
The DPA gives a dentist thirty days from the date of notice of revoca-
138. See Northwest Laundry, 27 F.3d at 158. In this case, the plaintiff, an ERISA health
insurance fund, claimed that by billing the fund for his "treatment" of covered cancer pa-
tients with antineoplastons, Burzynski had defrauded the fund and violated the terms of
the health plan. In the course of affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment
for the plaintiff, the court of appeals stated: "Reading the statutes together, we cannot
conclude that... section 5.09 [of the Texas Medical Practice Act] authorizes Dr. Burzynski
to do anything forbidden by Health and Safety Code § 431.114." Id. at 158.
139. 927 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
140. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. ch. 2001 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
141. See id. §§ 2001.051-.178.
142. Ramirez, 927 S.W.2d at 771.
143. Id.
144. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.003(1) (Vernon Supp. 1997), which defines a
"contested case" as "a proceeding, including a ratemaking or licensing proceeding, in
which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are to be determined by a state agency
after an opportunity for adjudicative hearing."
145. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 4.10(c) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
146. Ramirez, 927 S.W.2d at 772.
147. 925 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. 1996), rev'g 932 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. App.- der, 1995).
148. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4548h (Vernon Supp. 1997).
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tion to seek review in district court. 149 The APA, on the other hand, re-
quires the dentist in such a case to exhaust administrative remedies by
filing a motion for rehearing,150 and it gives boards up to forty-five days
to act on a motion for rehearing before it is deemed overruled by opera-
tion of law. 151 Mindful of both requirements, Dr. Simmons filed his mo-
tion for rehearing with the State Board of Dental Examiners (SBDE) on
the same day he was notified that the SBDE had revoked his license. 152
Ten days later, he petitioned the district court for judicial review of the
revocation order; fourteen days later he moved to stay the judicial-review
proceeding until the SBDE had taken action on his motion for rehearing,
and the district court granted his motion. When his motion for rehearing
was overruled by operation of law, Simmons moved to reinstate his judi-
cial-review action in the district court. The district court denied the mo-
tion, granted the SBDE's plea to the court's jurisdiction, and dismissed
the case,153 and the court of appeals affirmed. 154
The supreme court reversed and remanded the case to the district court
for a trial on the merits. Reasoning that the DPA requires an aggrieved
party to appeal before the board may have ruled on the motion for re-
hearing required by the APA, the court concluded that Simmons had
done all he could to satisfy both statutes and was entitled to obtain judi-
cial review in the district court. 155 The court distinguished the situation in
Simmons from the case of Lindsay v. Sterling,156 in which the licensing
statute merely required that judicial review be sought within thirty days
after the agency's action became final. Because the agency's action be-
came final only after the agency had ruled on the required motion for
rehearing, there was no conflict between the licensing statute and the
APA. By contrast, the conflict in Simmons was unavoidable, and the
supreme court resolved the conflict in favor of the aggrieved dentist. Un-
til the legislature corrects the situation with an amendment to the
DPA, 157 litigants in Dr. Simmons' situation will be permitted this slight
exception to the time requirements of the APA.
149. Id. § 3(a).
150. See TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.145(a) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
151. See id. § 2001.146(c).
152. Simmons, 925 S.W.2d at 652.
153. Id. at 653.
154. Simmons v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 932 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1995), rev'd 925 S.W.2d 652 (1996).
155. Simmons, 925 S.W.2d at 654.
156. 690 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1985).
157. Texas Senate Bill 877 would delete the portion of section 3(a) that requires judicial
review actions to be commenced within 30 days of notice of the Board's action. It would





A. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
1. ERISA Preemption
Two recent federal cases occurring in Texas continued to apply the
well-established federal preemption of state law claims under the provi-
sions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).158 In
the first of these cases, Hermann Hospital v. Pan American Life Insurance
Co. ,159 the hospital sought payment from the insurance company for serv-
ices provided to a patient who had been verified as having coverage with
the insurance company. Subsequent to the provision of hospital services,
the insurance company determined that the patient's coverage had ex-
pired several months before and refused to pay the hospital. Invoking its
reliance upon insurance company personnel verifying the coverage, the
hospital brought suit under a theory of negligent misrepresentation by
the company.
The trial court relied on precedent from a number of cases holding that
state claims arising from administration of a benefit plan are preempted
by ERISA. The hospital argued that the insurance company's tortious
conduct was independent and distinct from a wrongful denial of pay-
ments under the benefit plan. The court did not agree, distinguishing the
hospital's claim from claims that were not preempted but only remotely
affected by the plan. 160 The court further stated that a suit between two
third-party suppliers to different parts of the benefit plan did not alter the
relationship each party had to the plan and, therefore, preemption was
appropriate. 161
In the second Texas case involving ERISA, Smith v. Texas Children's
Hospital,162 a former hospital employee sued her employer claiming
fraudulent inducement and breach of contract. Smith had changed em-
ployment to Texas Children's Hospital, relying in part on the hospital's
representation that she would be able to obtain the long-term disability
benefits which she had with her previous employer. An ensuing illness
and claim for disability benefits was denied by the insurer on the basis of
a pre-existing condition exclusion in the policy.
While the trial court determined Smith's other claims were preempted
by ERISA, the fraudulent inducement claim was not preempted.' 63 The
hospital appealed the federal district court's remand to state district court
regarding the fraudulent inducement claim. The federal appeals court
agreed that Smith's claim for benefits under Texas Children's ERISA
plan was preempted. Whether she was entitled to benefits at all was not a
denial of benefits under such a plan, but was a question of whether Texas
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
159. 932 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
160. Id. at 901 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983)).
161. Id. at 903.
162. 84 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1996).
163. Id. at 155.
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law permits a plaintiff to recover for the value of benefits relinquished.
The court determined that Smith's entitlement to benefits was a separate
question from whether she was misled in believing she would be entitled
to benefits. 164 Whether Smith was mislead into believing she would be
entitled to benefits refers to what Texas Children's told her, while Smith's
entitlement to benefits focuses on Texas Children's ERISA plan. 65
2. Federal Employees Health Benefit Act Preemption
In a case similar to the preceding ERISA claims, Transitional Hospitals
Corp. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, Inc.166 involved claims by
the hospital against the insurance company for breach of contract, negli-
gent misrepresentation, and violation of state insurance law. The claims
arose out of a denial of payment after the insurance company had con-
firmed coverage for a patient treated at the hospital.
The insurance company attempted to remove the case from state to
federal court, arguing that the issues involved questions of federal law.
On review, the federal district court applied Fifth Circuit precedent, 67
noting that a well-pleaded complaint that does not on its face state a sub-
stantial, disputed question of federal law may avoid removal by a defend-
ant to federal court. The court acknowledged, however, that even an
artfully drawn complaint that had no legitimate state cause of action
could not survive removal to federal court. The court went on to apply
the rule that a well-pleaded complaint must fall within "complete pre-
emption" to qualify for removal. 168
On the matter of complete preemption, the court noted that precedent
established that it was not congressional intent that Federal Employee
Health Benefit Act (FEHBA) preemption be applied as broadly as ER-
ISA.169 FEHBA preemption was considered to involve matters relating
to the nature or extent of coverage or benefits to the extent that such
matters were inconsistent with contractual provisions of the plan.' 70
While FEHBA was acknowledged by the court to "broadly preempt state
law," its scope was not complete and would not support conversion of a
state claim to a federal claim permit removal to federal court.171
164. Id. at 157.
165. Id.
166. 924 F. Supp. 67 (1996).
167. Id. at 69 (citing Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362 (5th Cir.
1995)).
168. Transitional Hosps., 924 F. Supp. at 69.
169. Id. (citing Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306 (3d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1691 (1995)).
170. Id. at 70 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) (1995)).
171. Id. at 70-71.
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B. DETERMINATION OF BENEFITS UNDER STATE
MEDICAID PROGRAM
In Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Services Commission,172 the
central issue involved whether Fred, a 47 year-old resident of a nursing
home, qualified under Medicaid for an augmentative communication de-
vice (ACD). This case of first impression applied Texas Administrative
Code provisions that limited such devices to individuals under the age of
21,173 and limited the scope of "covered" services. 174
In reviewing the scope of services issue, the court noted that a state's
participation in federally-supported Medicaid programs required certain
minimum standards, including, but not limited to, inpatient hospitaliza-
tion, outpatient hospital services, laboratory and X-ray services.175 These
"mandatory" services do not include speech related devices or ACDs.
States may, however, offer optional services such as physical therapy and
"related" services. Once these optional services are provided by a state,
it is bound to offer optional services as defined by the Medicaid provi-
sions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act. 176 Although the Texas
Medicaid program had not elected to provide physical therapy and re-
lated services, it elected to provide home health care and prosthetic de-
vices. The definition of home health care included durable medical
equipment. While durable medical equipment was not defined in Medi-
caid terminology, the court agreed that the Texas Medicaid program ter-
minology, which included "equipment that can withstand repeated use
and is primarily and customarily used for medical purposes,"'177 was suffi-
cient to encompass durable medical equipment and, therefore, the aug-
mentative device fell within that description. 178
On the issue of age, the court cited precedent in Arizona179 and in the
Fifth Circuit 80 to arrive at the conclusion that age was not rationally re-
lated to the denial of medical benefits to Fred.
III. MANAGED CARE DEVELOPMENTS
A. ANY WILLING PROVIDER ISSUES
Legislation passed in 1995 is frequently referred to as the "Texas Any
Willing Pharmacy Law.'' In Texas Pharmacy Association v. Prudential
172. 924 F. Supp. 788 (1996).
173. See 25 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 33.112 (West Supp. 1996).
174. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 33.112 (West 1996).
175. Fred C., 924 F. Supp. at 790 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1), (2), (3), (17) (Supp.
1996)).
176. See Meyers v. Reagan, 776 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1985).
177. Fred C., 924 F. Supp. at 791 (quoting Medicaid Providers Proc. Manual, p. 323).
178. Id. at 792.
179. Id. at 791 (citing Salgado v. Kirshner, 878 P.2d 659 (Ariz. 1994) (finding it unrea-
sonable to deny medicaid funding on the basis of age)).
180. Id. (citing Curtis v. Taylor, 625 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1980) (Medicaid benefits distinc-
tions must be made on a "rational basis.")).
181. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.52B (Vernon 1996).
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Insurance Company of America,182 the Pharmacy Association sought a
declaration that Prudential was not adhering to the provisions of the new
statute, which required that any willing pharmacy provider be allowed to
participate as a contract provider if the pharmacy or pharmacist agreed to
meet all the terms required by those pharmacies and pharmacists already
under contract. Prudential countered that (1) the Association did not
have standing to sue, 183 (2) the Association was improperly interpreting
the statute,18 4 and (3) the statute itself was invalid under ERISA. 185
Finding the standing issue to be without merit, the court considered the
only substantive issues to involve the interpretation of the statute and the
ERISA preemption claim. The court rejected Prudential's contention
that the "terms and requirements" section of the statute permits Pruden-
tial to exercise "reasonable business judgment" which would include the
latitude to restrict the number of participating providers. 86 Taking a dif-
ferent view, the court interpreted the business judgment provision to ap-
ply to considerations such as economic, quality and accessibility. 187 The
court went on to examine the stated "purpose" of the statute, which read,
in part, "To prohibit a contractual provision in an insurance policy which
interferes with or limits the participant's ability to choose his own phar-
maceutical provider.' 88 Likewise, the court rejected Prudential's con-
tention that the previously existing administrative rules dealing with
"preferred providers" modified the statute, reasoning that those rules re-
late to providers practicing medicine or the healing arts but not to
pharmacies. 189
On the ERISA issue, the court turned to precedent cited by the Fourth
Circuit in Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Aetna Health Management,190 in
dealing with Prudential's claim that the Texas statute relates to the busi-
ness of insurance and is not within the savings clause of ERISA. Apply-
ing a two-pronged analysis of whether a statute fell within the savings
clause, the court found that the statute met the first prong, requiring that
the statute be clearly designed to regulate insurance contracts. 191 The
court also found that article 21.52b met the three factors of the second
prong: (i) the spreading of a policyholder's risk, (ii) in an integral part of
the policy relationship, (iii) for a practice limited to entities within the
insurance industry.' 92 Having met both prongs of the test, the court con-
cluded that the any willing pharmacy statute fell within the insurance sav-
182. Texas Pharmacy Assoc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 907 F. Supp. 1019 (1995).
183. Id. at 1021.
184. Id. at 1024.
185. Id. at 1025.
186. Id. at 1024.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing House Ins. Comm., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 486, 72d Leg., R.S. (1991)).
189. Id. at 1025 (citing 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3701-.3705).
190. 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1993).
191. Texas Pharmacy, 907 F. Supp. at 1025.
192. Id. at 1025-26.
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ings clause and, thus, was not preempted by ERISA.193
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In the case of Jennings v. Burgess,194 the Texas Supreme Court affirmed
a trial court's grant of summary judgment to a physician in a medical
malpractice case. While the primary basis for upholding the trial court
decision the statute of limitations, the concurring opinion by Justice Raul
Gonzalez reviewed and confirmed a line of cases in Texas and other juris-
dictions which hold that a physician is not negligent for "negligent refer-
ral" unless the referring physician fails to exercise reasonable care in
making a recommendation. 195
The concurring opinion also offered a glimpse of possible future judi-
cial policy. Justice Gonzalez noted that the common theme among the
negligent referral cases cited above is that there must be more than a
referral alone, "there must be knowledge of incompetency or some other
triggering factor."'1 96 Justice Gonzalez noted that current developments
in the delivery of health care such as "managed care systems" and HMOs
were diffusing the traditional chain of authority, implying that normal re-
ferral mechanisms may not be functioning in the patient's best inter-
ests. 197 If these issues are not addressed by the Texas Legislature in some
comprehensive manner, Justice Gonzalez believes that the courts may be
forced to "re-think" traditional notions of duty and standards of care to
protect the interests of both victims of medical malpractice and physi-
cians from frivolous litigation.198
IV. MENTAL HEALTH
A. TORT LIABILITY IN A GOVERNMENTAL FACILITY
In Kerrville State Hospital v. Clark,199 a governmental hospital ap-
pealed its liability for damages resulting from the alleged negligent re-
lease of a patient, Gary Ligon, who murdered Rebecca Clark Ligon. The
central issue in Clark was whether the hospital's administration of oral
versus injectable medication fell within the waiver of sovereign immunity
required to impose liability on a governmental entity.200
Rebecca's parents (the Clarks) contended that the administration of
oral medication on an outpatient basis and the patient's failure to take
the medication caused the patient's mental condition which lead to their
daughter's murder. The Clarks argued that administration of the medica-
193. Id. at 1026.
194. 917 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1996).
195. See id. at 795 (Gonzalez, J., concurring). Several Texas cases have relied on this
standard, most recently in Johnson v. Whitehurst, 652 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
196. Id. at 796 (Gonzalez, J. concurring).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 923 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1996).
200. Id. at 584.
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tion by injection would have prevented the death. On this basis, the
Clarks claimed that the hospital had "misused tangible personal prop-
erty" in the treatment of patient Ligon. A condition or use of tangible
personal or real property must be involved before a governmental entity
can be considered to have waived its sovereign immunity.201
In reviewing other Texas cases which considered the issue of "use" and
"non-use," the Texas Supreme Court determined that the decision of the
hospital not to administer an injectable form of the medication was "non-
use" rather than "misuse" and therefore did not constitute a waiver of
sovereign immunity. 202
B. APPLICATION OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY FOR
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
In Drogin v. Campbell,20 3 employees of San Antonio State Hospital
sought to overturn a ruling against their summary judgment motion in
favor of the administrator and family of the estate of a deceased patient
of the hospital. Drogin involved a patient who committed suicide after
being furloughed from the hospital. The estate and family claimed that
the hospital and its employees were negligent in the release of the pa-
tient, who fell or jumped from a bridge two days after her release from
the hospital. The estate alleged that a contributing factor in the patient's
death was an attempted rape of the patient.
In seeking summary judgment, the employees sought "official immu-
nity" under the Texas Mental Health Code. 20 4 The court reviewed the
precedent set forth in Kassen v. Hatley,2°5 which distinguished functions
of the employees as either "governmental" or "medical." Governmental
functions were accorded immunity, while medical functions were not.20 6
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court's finding that medical
functions were involved in the staffs handling of the patient's discharge,
thus upholding the trial court's denial of summary judgement.20 7
As a side note to this case, which occurred in 1992, House Bill 383208
which was passed in 1995, extended limitations on liability to governmen-
tal employees except for providers of health care.209
201. See University of Texas Medical Branch v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1994).
202. Kerrville, 932 S.W.2d at 584.
203. 928 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, n.w.h.).
204. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 571.019(a) (Vernon 1992).
205. 887 S.W.2.d 4 (Tex. 1994).
206. See id. at 11.
207. Drogin, 928 S.W.2d at 208.
208. Act of May 18, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 139, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 982
(Vernon).
209. See Stephen G. Wohleb, Tort Reform and House Bill 383: How Public Servants in




V. PEER REVIEW AND CONFIDENTIALITY DEVELOPMENTS
A. PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
In a series of cases decided by the Texas Supreme Court and handed
down on July 12, 1996, the court clarified a number of issues related to
the privilege of confidentiality for medical peer review records. Medical
peer review records are accorded a privilege from discovery under sev-
eral Texas statues, including the MPA and the Health and Safety Code.210
In addition to clarifying what records are subject to the privilege, the
court dealt with the issue of malice and whether it afforded a plaintiff any
greater access to privileged records.
In Memorial Hospital-The Woodlands v. McCown,211 the plaintiff, Dr.
Bruce Leipzig, sued a television broadcast company claiming the he was
defamed by a report that included information about him. As part of the
discovery process, Leipzig requested information about his initial applica-
tion for staff privileges and membership. The hospital sought to protect
the records from production under the MPA and the Health and Safety
Code. After being overruled at the trial court level, the hospital filed a
mandamus action to the Texas Supreme Court.
In argument before the court, all parties agreed that peer review
records generated in connection with a physician already on staff were
protected. Therefore, the question was limited to the issue of records
related to initial staff privileges and membership. The court's review fo-
cused on section 5.06(s)(3)212 of the MPA and whether a hospital commit-
tee considering a physician's initial application for privileges and
membership fell within the definition of a medical peer review committee
as provided in the MPA. The court acknowledged the confidentiality of
records of a medical peer review committee and determined that the
functions of a hospital committee in considering the denial of member-
ship or privileges are entitled to the same protection.213 While not rely-
ing on the federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA),214
the court noted that the initial "peer review in the initial credentialing
process is an important part of the overall statutory scheme to improve
the quality of medical care. '215
The court rejected the argument that documents relating to initial
credentialing were "records made or maintained in the regular course of
business" and thus subject to discovery.216 Records kept in the ordinary
course of business were described as "records kept in connection with the
treatment of [a hospital's] individual patients as well as the business and
210. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
211. 927 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996).
212. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.06(s)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
213. Woodlands, 927 S.W.2d at 3-4.
214. 42 U.S.C. 11101 et seq.
215. Woodlands, 927 S.W.2d at 6.




administrative files and papers apart from committee deliberations. '2 17
The court went on to reaffirm Jordan v. Fourth Court of Appeals,218 which
held that records "gratuitously submitted to a committee" or "created
without committee impetus and purpose" would not be privileged.2 19 In
other conflicting decisions, the court disapproved of McAllen Methodist
Hospital v. Ramirez,220 Family Medical Center, U. T v. Ramirez,221 and
Riverside Hospital, Inc. v. Garza,222 to the extent they hold that no infor-
mation relating to initial credentialing is privileged.
The next case handed down by the Texas Supreme Court, Brownwood
Regional Hospital v. The Eleventh Court of Appeals, 223 dealt with a re-
quest for peer review information in a medical malpractice suit against a
doctor and alleged negligent credentialing against the hospital.224 At the
trial court, a request for peer review information was denied on the basis
of privilege under the MPA and the Health and Safety Code. On appeal,
the court relied on Riverside Hospital to grant the requested relief. The
Texas Supreme Court cited the Woodlands decision in reversing the ap-
peals court decision. 225 Without making any distinctions from the Wood-
lands case, the court also noted that health care liability claims were not
among the exceptions to discovery for peer review information. 226 Of the
items sought by the plaintiffs, the court determined that hospital and
medical staff bylaws were not protected from discovery, and further
noted that information needed to support their case was available from
other sources. 227
The last of the cases, Irving HealthCare System v. Brooks,22 8 was based
on a lawsuit request for initial application information in which the plain-
tiff physician was claiming that false information was supplied intention-
ally and maliciously by the defendant in the course of the plaintiff's
application for membership at other hospitals. The court cited the Wood-
lands case issued the same day for the proposition that the information
sought was privileged and not discoverable.2 29 The remaining issue was
whether a claim involving malice would entitle the physician to discovery.
In ruling that no discovery should be permitted, the court examined
provisions of the MPA which confer immunity and protection from dis-
217. Id. at 10 (quoting Texarkana Memorial Hosp. v. Jones, 551 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex.
1977)).
218. 701 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1985).
219. Woodlands, 927 S.W.2d at 10 (quoting Jordan, 701 S.W.2d at 648).
220. 855 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
221. 855 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
222. 894 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
223. 927 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. 1996).
224. An interesting comment was made by the court in footnote 1, where the court
wrote that it was not deciding whether a cause of action for "negligent credentialing" exists
in Texas, nor the elements of such a cause of action. Id. at 26 n.1.
225. Id. at 26.
226. Id. at 27.
227. Id.
228. 927 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1996).
229. Id. at 15.
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covery for peer review activities.2 30 The court did not find any connec-
tion between immunity and discovery, and held that even where proof of
malice would negate the immunities afforded the privilege from discov-
ery, the two matters were separate and distinct.2 31 Further support was
cited in section 5.06(g) of the MPA, which specifically excepts anticompe-
titive or civil rights actions from the privilege of confidentiality, but not
other causes of action. 232 As in Brownwood, above, the court observed
that alternative sources of information were available to the plaintiff in
preparing his case.233
B. PEER REVIEW IMMUNITY
In Agbor v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital,234 the Agbors appealed a
summary judgment in favor of the hospital in which the Agbors sued for
medical malpractice by a doctor and negligent credentialing by the hospi-
tal. The trial court granted the hospital's motion based upon the asser-
tion that the MPA provided an immunity from credentialing actions by a
hospital absent a showing of malice.
In the course of rejecting the hospital's position and reversing the sum-
mary judgment, the appeals court examined provisions of the MPA, the
HCQIA and their respective legislative histories. The court first found
that section 5.06(l) and (in) of the MPA conferred immunities for peer
review committee activities and its members, but did not extend to sepa-
rate negligent acts of a health care entity.235 Second, the court deter-
mined that an impossible burden would be placed on plaintiffs if a
showing of malice was required before negligence could be established,
since the proper application of privilege would limit access to much of the
proof necessary to establish malice.236 Third, the court compared provi-
sions of the MPA incorporating the HCQIA, 237 and observed that
HCQIA expressly provided 238 that it did not affect the rights and reme-
dies available to patients.239 In its final point, the court's examination of
the legislative histories of both acts indicated that the intent was clearly
to keep disgruntled physicians from suing peer review participants.240
Based on these four findings the court held that the negligent credential-
ing claim was not barred by the immunities section of the MPA.2 41
230. Id. at 16.
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 18.
234. 912 S.W. 354 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
235. Id. at 357.
236. Id. But see Irving Healthcare Sys. v. Brooks, 927 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1996), in which
the court observed that limited access to peer review records should not impose an undue
burden since alternative sources of information was available to the plaintiffs.
237. TEx. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 4495b § 5.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
238. 42 U.S.C. § 11115(d) (1994).
239. Agbor, 912 S.W.2d at 358.




VI. PHYSICIAN CONTRACT RIGHTS
A. EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTING AND TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
In the case of Cavillo v. Gonzalez,242 the Texas Supreme Court applied
recent precedent in reversing a court of appeals decision on the issue of
tortious interference with business relations. The case involved Dr.
Cavillo, who had an exclusive contract for anesthesiology services with
San Jacinto Methodist Hospital, and Dr. Gonzalez, who had privileges at
the hospital to practice anesthesiology. According to terms of the con-
tract, Dr. Cavillo had sole authority to schedule anesthesia services and,
after disagreements with Dr. Gonzalez, refused to schedule Gonzalez.
Gonzalez filed suit against Cavillo and the hospital alleging numerous
claims, including breach of contract, tortious interference with contract,
tortious interference with business relations, civil conspiracy, and illegal
restraint of trade.
The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the hospital and
Cavillo on all claims. On appeal, that court upheld the summary judg-
ment, but found that the defendant's motivations were fact issues that
might bear on the claim of tortious interference with business relations.
That decision was reversed by the Texas Supreme Court and rendered
against Gonzalez.2 43
The supreme court applied Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green,2 which
held that a defendant's motivation behind the assertion of a legal right
was irrelevant since the right itself established a defense of justifica-
tion.245 The court determined that the justification defense was applica-
ble to claims of tortious interference in business relations both on an
existing or prospective basis. 246 Following that reasoning, Cavillo's exclu-
sive contract justified his interference with Gonzalez' prospects for busi-
ness at the hospital and the issue of good faith was therefore irrelevant.
B. PROFESSIONAL SERVICE AGREEMENT AND WAIVER OF RIGHTS
In Dillee v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word Health Care Sys-
tem,247 Dr. Dillee sued the hospital system alleging violation of constitu-
tional and contract rights to due process in connection with the hospital
system's termination of his professional services agreement. The profes-
sional services agreement contained a termination without cause provi-
sion as well as a provision in which Dillee specifically waived any due
process rights to notice, hearing, or review in the event of termination of
the agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for the hospi-
tal system and Dillee appealed. On appeal, the court concluded that due
process rights were waived and confined its review to the effectiveness of
242. 922 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
243. Id.
244. 921 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1996).
245. Cavillo, 922 S.W.2d at 929.
246. Id.




The court acknowledged that contract rights could be intentionally re-
linquished,249 as could constitutional rights, so long as the waiver was
done in a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing manner.250 The circum-
stances of a waiver could, however, involve an "adhesion contract" in
which case a waiver might not be enforceable. 251 In reviewing the facts
before it, the court determined that Dillee did not suffer a great disparity
in bargaining power since he received a substantial right in the contract
being exclusive. 252 In return for that right, he waived his hearing rights.
These circumstances led the appeals court to hold that the agreement's
provisions were effective as a matter of law, and that Dillee raised no fact
issues as to the validity of the waiver.2 53
On motion for rehearing with respect to third-party beneficiary rights
that Dillee had previously asserted, the appeals court reiterated that the
waiver of rights was effective notwithstanding whether Dillee would be
entitled to any third-party rights that might accrue to him from the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations standards
which require due process in medical staff relations. 254
VII. MEDICAL LIABILITY
A. INDEMNIFICATION BY STATE
In 1989 the Legislature obligated the state to provide indemnification
for malpractice to doctors who devote at least ten percent of their prac-
tice to charity care.255 The indemnification, however, is available only
with respect to claims that accrue on or after the effective date of the new
law: January 1, 1990.256 In Texas v. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals,25 7
the Texas Supreme Court held that the question of when the malpractice
cause of action accrues is governed by the Medical Liability and Insur-
ance Improvement Act.258 The Act abolished the discovery rule for
"health care liability claims" in favor of a strict, two-year limitations pe-
riod, beginning with one of three times: "[1] the occurrence of the breach
or tort or [2] from the date the medical or health care treatment that is
the subject of the claim or [3] the hospitalization for which the claim is
248. Id. at 309.
249. Id. (citing Huffington v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1976)).
250. Id. (citing D. H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972)).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 310.
253. Id. at 311.
254. Dillee v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word Health Care Sys., No. 14-94-
00689-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 14, 1995, no writ) (not designated for
publication), 1995 WL 739416.
255. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.002 (Vernon Supp. 1997); see also
Texas v. Pruett, 900 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tex. 1995) (legislature's purpose was, "in part, to
encourage physicians and other health care professionals to provide charity care").
256. See Texas v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 933 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex. 1996).
257. 933 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1996).
258. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1997).
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made is completed. '259 Even if a malpractice plaintiff were to get the
benefit of an extended limitations period or a later accrual date under the
Texas Constitution's open-courts provision,260 that provision is not appli-
cable to the question of when a malpractice cause of action accrued for
purposes of the charity-indemnification statute. 261 The court "recog-
nize[d] that under this reading of [the charity indemnification statute]
there may be claims that are timely brought, but for which there is no
indemnity. '262 Because the state's indemnification obligation is a volun-
tary one, "[t]he open courts provision does not require the Legislature to
authorize indemnification of claims arising before a certain date, even if
the provision would allow an injured person to sue after the limitations
has expired. '263
B. WRONGFUL PREGNANCY
Actions for "wrongful pregnancy" or "wrongful conception" are find-
ing increasing acceptance around the country, and Texas is no stranger to
that trend. In Crawford v. Kirk,264 the Texarkana Court of Appeals be-
came the most recent to recognize the cause of action, joining the courts
of appeals in Waco 2 65 and San Antonio.2 66 The mother in Crawford sued
her obstetrician when she became pregnant with twins within months of
receiving a tubal ligation. The pregnancy was medically difficult, involv-
ing three hospitalizations totaling forty-seven days. Her suit alleged neg-
ligent performance of the sterilization procedure and sought damages for
the medical expenses associated with the pregnancy, physical and mental
pain and suffering, and the costs of raising the twins until they reach the
age of majority. The court of appeals ruled that damages would be ap-
propriate to compensate for the medical expenses associated with the
pregnancy, but not pain and suffering or maintenance and support. 267
This result places Texas squarely within the majority of jurisdictions that
have considered this issue, with only three jurisdictions permitting awards
259. Id. § 10.01.
260. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. This provision prohibits an otherwise-applicable limita-
tions period from cutting off a plaintiff's common-law cause of action before the plaintiff
knew or should have known the cause of action existed. See, e.g., Hellman v. Mateo, 772
S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex. 1989); Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. 1985). It also has
provided the basis for the Texas Supreme Court's holding that article 4590i is unconstitu-
tional to the extent § 10.01 would cut off a minor's cause of action before the minor at-
tained the age of majority. See Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995).
261. See Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 933 S.W.2d at 46.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 929 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ requested).
265. See Flax v. McNew, 896 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ).
266. See Garwood v. Locke, 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). Cf. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974) (holding that certain types of damages may not be
recovered in a wrongful pregnancy case, but neither approving nor disapproving the theory
of recovery).
267. Crawford, 929 SW.2d at 637.
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for maintenance and support.268
VIII. PATIENTS' RIGHTS
A. ANATOMICAL GIFTS
In Seamans v. Harris County Hospital District,269 the parents of a
nineteen-year-old woman who died at Ben Taub Hospital donated her
body to the Baylor Medical School for anatomical study. Although this
donation was communicated to Baylor, the medical school never ar-
ranged for the transfer of the decedent's body. After twenty-days in the
morgue, "the body was no longer in a condition suitable for medical re-
search," 270 and the hospital called the parents to notify them that their
daughter's body was still in the morgue. Understandably shocked and
distressed, the parents sued the hospital for its negligent infliction of
emotional pain and distress. Summary judgment was granted on immu-
nity grounds, 271 and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court identified two sources of immunity. As a political subdivi-
sion of the state, the Harris County Hospital District enjoys sovereign
immunity except to the extent waived by the Tort Claims Act,272 such as
when "personal injury [is] caused by a condition or use of tangible per-
sonal ... property. '273 Plaintiffs argued that this limited waiver applied
to their case because the hospital's negligent acts involved the nonuse or
misuse of its "gurney, morgue refrigeration units, transport vehicle, policy
and procedure manual and corpse preservation property and other equip-
ment. '274 The court held that, notwithstanding allegations of mere use or
nonuse, plaintiffs must have summary judgment evidence that would sup-
port a finding that their injury was caused by the hospital's misuse of
personal property, which was lacking in this case.275
268. See Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 1990); Lovelace Medical Ctr. v. Mendez,
805 P.2d 603, 612 (N.M. 1991); Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Wis. 1990).
269. 934 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
270. Id. at 394.
271. Had the immunity defense not been available, it would appear that summary judg-
ment-if not an earlier dismissal on special exceptions-would also have been appropriate
on the basis of the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594
(Tex. 1993) (no cause of action in Texas for negligent infliction of mental distress).
272. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon Supp. 1997) provides that
a governmental unit is liable for:
(1) property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the
wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his
scope of employment if:
(A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises from the opera-
tion or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and
(B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to
Texas law; and
(2) personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible
personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private
person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.
273. Id.




Even if the Tort Claims Act had been interpreted to preclude sovereign
immunity, the court held that the state's Anatomical Gift Act 276 also im-
munized the hospital district from liability for its negligence.2 77 The Act
broadly provides immunity from civil and criminal liability for anyone
"who acts in good faith in accordance with this chapter ... if the prereq-
uisites for an anatomical gift are met. '278 Although the intended benefi-
ciaries of this immunity provision are the body and organ donors,
physicians who declare death and who harvest the donated organs, and
organ procurement personnel whose requests might be upsetting to griev-
ing relatives of the deceased, the immunity provision is arguably broad
enough to include the negligent hospital (or medical school) whose fail-
ure to effectuate the gift might also cause harm.
B. PATIENT DUMPING
In Rios v. Baptist Memorial Hospital,279 the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals took a rare look at the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA).280 The federal statute takes aim at the
practice of "patient dumping" by requiring Medicare-certified hospitals
to provide a medically appropriate screening for any patient who "comes
to the [hospital's] emergency department. ' 281 If the patient has an emer-
gency medical condition,282 the statute requires that the condition be sta-
bilized and that, with some exceptions, the patient not be transferred
until the emergency medical condition has been stabilized. 283
In Rios the issue was whether the patient had "come to the emergency
department" so as to trigger the hospital's duty to screen for an emer-
gency medical condition. Three days after he injured his arm on the job,
Rios called his personal physician, Dr. Horn, who examined him in his
private office. Although Horn found no evidence of an emergency condi-
tion, he arranged for a second opinion by Dr. Holliman at Baptist Memo-
276. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ch. 692 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1997).
277. Seamans, 934 S.W.2d at 396.
278. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 692.016(a) (Vernon 1992).
279. 935 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, n.w.h.).
280. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
281. Id. § 1395dd(a).
282. The statute defines "emergency medical condition" as
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient
severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical
attention could reasonably be expected to result in-
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant wo-
man, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant women [sic] who is having contractions-
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospi-
tal before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman or
the unborn child.
Id. § 1395dd(e)(1).
283. Id. § 1395dd(b), (c).
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rial Hospital. Dr. Holliman asked that Rios meet him at the hospital's
emergency room. The patient then went to the emergency room, pausing
only to ask for directions to the admitting department, apparently on the
assumption that he was to be examined and admitted by Dr. Holliman.
The patient alleged that he was not examined and not admitted because
he had no health insurance. He then went to the downtown Baptist Med-
ical Center, where he was admitted. Before he could be treated (some
four hours after going to Baptist Memorial), an abscess ruptured in his
arm. He was treated by two physicians who opined that Rios "was never
in danger of losing his arm or life, and he suffered no serious impairment
to his bodily functions. '284 In his action against Baptist Memorial for
allegedly violating EMTALA, the district court granted summary judg-
ment to the hospital, and the court of appeals affirmed. 285
The court of appeals concluded that on these facts, Rios never "came
to the emergency department" and therefore the hospital had no duty to
screen for the existence of an emergency medical condition. This is cer-
tainly a plausible reading of the statutory language and the facts of the
case. However, regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, which were neither cited nor discussed by
the court of appeals, appear to be considerably less demanding. Those
regulations state that "comes to the emergency department means, with
respect to an individual requesting examination or treatment, that the in-
dividual is on the hospital property. '286 While there can be no disputing
that Rios was "on the hospital property," it is unclear whether Rios re-
quested examination or treatment. Although Rios apparently never
asked for examination or treatment during his brief trip through the
emergency room, he stated in his affidavit in opposition to the hospital's
motion for summary judgment that he requested examination and treat-
ment in the admitting department. 28 7 This should have created a factual
issue that would have made summary judgment inappropriate, except for
the court of appeals' position that Rios' request for examination or treat-
ment had to be directed to emergency room personnel in order to trigger
the screening obligation of EMTALA. This places a higher burden on
patients than do the federal EMTALA regulations, which do not appear
to require patients to perform triage in their own cases. In a case such as
Rios, where all indications (including Rios' own behavior) are that no
emergency medical condition existed, no harm may mean no foul. With a
more sympathetic set of facts, however, the court of appeals' approach
will not well serve the interests of patients.
284. Rios, 935 S.W.2d at 801.
285. Id. at 800.
286. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b) (1996).
287. Rios, 935 S.W.2d at 803.
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C. DUTY TO WARN
In Garcia v. Santa Rosa Health Care Corp. ,288 the court of appeals in
Corpus Christi held that a hospital had a Tarasoft2 89-type duty to warn a
patient's fiancee that the patient, who was a recipient of the hospital's
allegedly tainted blood products, could be HIV-positive. 290
The patient was a hemophiliac who was allegedly infected with HIV
when he was transfused with blood products that the hospital later
learned were tainted with the AIDS virus. Although the hospital at-
tempted to schedule the patient for annual HIV testing, it is unclear
whether the hospital actually told him he might be HIV-positive. 291 In
any event, he did not get tested until after he married the plaintiff. The
hospital also learned of the patient's plans to marry the plaintiff, but ap-
parently never informed her of her fiancee's likely infection.292 Plaintiff
sued the hospital for negligent failure to notify her of her fiancee's (and
then husband's) probable HIV status. 293
The hospital defended on three grounds: that it had no tort duty to
inform the plaintiff concerning her fiancee's probable infection and that
principles of physician-patient privilege and the Communicable Disease
Prevention and Control Act (CDPCA) 294 forbid such a disclosure. The
court of appeals rejected all three defenses and reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment.
First, the court expressly adopted the reasoning of the California
Supreme Court in TarasofJ95 and held that
health-care professionals who discover some disease or medical con-
dition which their services or products have likely caused to a partic-
ular recipient and which may endanger a readily identifiable third
party, owe a duty to reasonably warn the third party to the extent
that such a warning may be given without violating any duty of confi-
dentiality to the recipient of services or products.2 96
288. 925 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ requested).
289. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
290. Garcia, 925 S.W.2d at 377.
291. Id. at 378.
292. Id.
293. The patient was also a plaintiff in the suit as originally filed. After commencing
suit, however, he and his wife divorced, and he later died. The patient's mother, as the
personal representative of his estate, voluntarily dismissed his claims. In addition, the
plaintiff-appellant brought a second claim against the hospital for intentional infliction of
mental distress. The hospital obtained summary judgment on that claim, and the plaintiff
did not appeal. See id. at 376 n.1.
294. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.103 (Vernon 1992).
295. In Tarasoff, a patient repeatedly told his therapist that he wanted to kill an un-
named but readily identifiable third party. When the patient carried out his plan, the wo-
man's parent's sued the therapist on the theory that he breached his duty to their daughter
to warn her of his patient's intentions. The California Supreme Court held that therapist
had a duty, based upon the special relationship that exists between the patient and his
therapist, "to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger .
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340.
296. Garcia, 925 S.W.2d at 377.
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In so holding, the court of appeals has adopted a doctrine that has not
been embraced by the Texas Supreme Court. The court also expanded
the doctrine beyond mental-health cases, which was the context in which
Tarasoff arose and in which a small number of Texas courts have recog-
nized a duty to warn third parties. 297
The court also rejected the hospital's argument that the CDPCA ne-
gates a Tarasoff-type duty to warn when the risk of harm is not from a
threatened violent act but from HIV infection. The Act prohibits the re-
lease of HIV test results to any person, subject to certain enumerated
exceptions.298 The court of appeals read this provision narrowly, con-
cluding that it applies only to HIV test results, not to information about a
person's probable HIV status when that is determined from non-test, en-
vironmental or situational factors. 299 Similarly, the court concluded that
there is no common-law confidentiality requirement when information
about a person's probable HIV status is learned outside the physician-
patient relationship.
The hospital's writ of review is currently pending before the Texas
Supreme Court.
IX. FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS-FRAUD AND ABUSE
Although not a state law development, the district court's decision in
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.300 de-
serves at least brief mention. This was a qui tam action301 brought by a
physician against Columbia/HCA and a number of related entities in
297. See Limon v. Gonzaba, 940 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ de-
nied) (discussing Texas cases); Kehler v. Eudaly, 933 S.W.2d 321, 329-32 (Tex. App.-Ft.
Worth 1996, writ denied) (same).
298. The exceptions are:
(1) the department [of health] under this chapter;
(2) a local health authority if reporting is required under this chapter;
(3) the Centers for Disease Control of the United States Public Health
Service if reporting is required by federal law or regulation;
(4) the physician or other person authorized by law who ordered the test;
(5) a physician, nurse, or other health care personnel who have a legiti-
mate need to know the test result in order to provide for their protection and
to provide for the patient's health and welfare;
(6) the person tested or a person legally authorized to consent to the test
on the person's behalf;
(7) the spouse of the person tested if the person tests positive for AIDS or
HIV infection, antibodies to HIV, or infection with any other probable caus-
ative agent of AIDS;
(8) a person authorized to receive test results under Article 21.31, Code of
Criminal Procedure, concerning a person who is tested as required or author-
ized under that article; and
(9) a person exposed to HIV infection as provided by Section 81.050.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.103 (Vernon 1992).
299. Garcia, 925 S.W.2d at 376.
300. 938 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
301. A "qui tam action" is brought pursuant to a statute that permits private individuals
to sue for damages to vindicate the interest of some governmental body or other public
institution that is entitled to share in the judgment, if any. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1250 (6th ed. 1990).
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which the relator Thompson alleged numerous inducements and relation-
ships that were supposed to constitute violations of the Medicare/Medi-
caid illegal remuneration 302 and "Stark" 303 provisions.304 These alleged
violations in turn formed the basis for Thompson's qui tam action on be-
half of the United States pursuant to the federal False Claims Act.30 5
Relying principally upon a 1977 Fifth Circuit decision that did not in-
volve health providers or laws, 30 6 the district court ruled that an essential
element of a claim under the False Claims Act is that the government
suffered financial harm because of the submission of a fraudulent claim,
either because it paid a claim for services or items that were not provided
or because it paid more than it should have on account of the defendant's
fraud.307 Although Thompson alleged that some of the services provided
by the defendants were not medically necessary, the district court dis-
missed those allegations because they were not pleaded with the degree
of particularity 30 8 required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 30 9 Once these allegations were stricken from the complaint,
Thompson could not argue that the Medicare program paid more for the
services provided by the defendants even if it were assumed, as it must be
for purposes of deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, that the allegations of
referral fraud were true. All Thompson could argue was that, had the
alleged illegal remuneration not been paid, some other providers would
have billed Medicare for the same services for which the defendants in
this case billed Medicare. This, concluded the district court, is not enough
to state a claim under the False Claims Act in the Fifth Circuit.310
At least two other district courts, both in the Sixth Circuit, have
reached the opposite result, holding that harm to the public fisc is not an
302. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994). This provision, in brief, makes it a crime for any
individual to pay or receive, or to offer to pay or to offer to receive, anything of value, in
cash or in kind, directly or indirectly, in return for or to induce a patient referral that will
result in an item or a service for which the Medicare or Medicaid program will be required
to pay.
303. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994). Named for the California Congressman who was its
chief supporter (Rep. Whitney "Pete" Stark), this provision prohibits a physician and
members of his or her immediate family from referring patients, for the purpose of receiv-
ing certain "designated health services," to entities with which the physician has a finan-
cial relationship (either an investment interest or a compensation interest). This law also
prohibits such physicians from submitting bills to the Medicare or Medicaid program in
connection with any such referrals.
304. Relator Thompson also alleged that the defendants filed cost reports that falsely
certified the defendants' compliance with Medicare anti-fraud laws and that some of the
services for which Medicare was billed were not medically necessary. Thompson, 938 F.
Supp. at 401-02. These allegations, like the alleged violations of the referral provisions,
formed the basis for Thompson's causes of action under the False Claims Act, and-like
the referral claims-were dismissed by the District Court.
305. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq. (1994).
306. United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
307. Thompson, 938 F. Supp. at 405.
308. Id. at 407.
309. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.").
310. Thompson, 938 F. Supp. at 405.
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essential element of a claim under the False Claims Act and that a viola-
tion of the Medicare referral provisions alone can provide the predicate
for a violation of the False Claims Act.31' The Supreme Court may shed
some light on this disagreement when it decides Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States ex rel. Schumer312 during its 1996 Term. Among the many
issues raised by this defense-contract case, Hughes Aircraft has argued
there can be no liability under the False Claims Act unless the defend-
ant's conduct has produced harm to the federal treasury. 313
311. See United States ex reL Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507,
1513 (M.D. Tenn. 1996); United States ex rel. Roy v. Anthony, 914 F. Supp. 1504, 1506
(S.D. Ohio 1994).
312. No. 95-1340 (U.S.), argued Feb. 27, 1997, 65 U.S.L.W. 3610 (Mar. 11, 1997).
313. Id.
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